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Local Political Consolidation in Bangladesh: Power,
Informality and Patronage
David Lewis and Abul Hossain
ABSTRACT
During the past decade Bangladesh has shifted from a competitively clien-
telistic two-party system towards a dominant-party democracy. This article
analyses how the ruling party has consolidated partisan political control at
the local level. Using qualitative field data from 2004 and 2016, and drawing
on a post-structural analysis of the state, it shows how this extension of power
has been achieved locally through interaction between formal and informal
political initiatives. Four main types of informal activity are documented,
through which the extent of local political competition has been reduced:
circumvention, capture, brokerage and the creation of new organizations.
These insights into the changing nature of Bangladesh’s long-standing par-
tisan politics highlight how the state’s capacity to deliver local services,
allocate resources and maintain stability has been enhanced through the rul-
ing party’s control of local government structures, its elimination of political
opposition, and its reshaping of local patronage arrangements.
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Bangladesh met the World Bank’s criteria for classification as a
‘lower middle-income country’, a striking turnaround for a nation given
limited prospects when it seceded from Pakistan in 1971. This transition
has been based on a relatively inclusive path of export-led development
that, combined with effective public and private investments in human and
social capital, has produced a pattern of pro-poor growth (Hossain, 2017;
Lewis, 2011). Yet Bangladesh has also come to be regarded as a case of
governance failure, characterized by an antagonistic form of ‘winner-takes-
all’ politics fought out between two main political parties, and with high
levels of corruption (Islam, 2013). Some observers have therefore referred
to the Bangladesh ‘paradox’, pondering the relationship between economic
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growth and social progress on the one hand and political dysfunction and
lack of democratic consolidation on the other (e.g. Khondker, 2018).
Anxieties around governance have further increased with a recent shift
from a merely dysfunctional form of politics towards a more specifically au-
thoritarian type of single-party democracy. The ruling Awami League (AL)
has been in power since 2008, and has sought to consolidate its position as
the ‘natural’ party of government through its management of the economy,
by undermining its political opposition, and by extending patronage roots
further into local communities. In 2014, the party was returned to power
when the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) refused to
participate in the election. This was the first time that an incumbent gov-
ernment had been re-elected since the restoration of electoral democracy in
1991, signalling a shift from a competitively clientelist two-party system to
a dominant-party democracy. This new period of political continuity has not
made Bangladesh’s politics any less harsh. The AL government has come
under increased local and international criticism for its deteriorating human
rights record, with reports of forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings,
arbitrary arrests of journalists, and the imposition of new legal restrictions
on civil society organizations (see, e.g., The Guardian, 2017; HRW, 2016).
Nevertheless, the political consolidation project has continued and intensi-
fied, and the AL secured a third term of government during the national
elections that took place in December 2018.
In making its decisive break with the recent past, the AL has disrupted
an established elite political settlement that has pertained for the past three
decades. This had produced conditions of competitive clientelism between
two opposing party blocs driven not primarily by ideological difference but
by short-term accumulation goals and intense political antagonism, orga-
nized through a patron–client pyramidal structure with the two main politi-
cal parties at the top (Islam, 2013; Khan, 2013). The effort to move beyond
this long-standing pattern of rotating plunder has required a national-level
strategy with multiple elements: the successful management of a growing
export-led economy (with an average of 6 per cent GDP growth achieved
during the past decade); careful and pragmatic alliance building with key
religious and military interest groups in order to minimize dissent; the abo-
lition of the distinctive three-month neutral ‘caretaker government’ system
that since 1991 had overseen each election; and the politicized use of the
International Crimes Tribunal (set up in 2009 ostensibly to secure justice for
crimes committed during the 1971 war) to weaken political opposition.
While the party’s strategies have received some analysis at the national
level (Riaz, 2016; Zafarullah, 2013), comparatively less attention has been
paid to the micro-politics of how this consolidation has been achieved lo-
cally in rural areas. By consolidation, we refer primarily to the AL’s suc-
cess in obtaining and maintaining control of state resources. This has taken
place against a backdrop of continuing efforts to build a more account-
able and inclusive local government system through reforms to sub-district
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and community-level administrative institutions (Chowdhury and Panday,
2018). In what follows we identify and analyse changing political practices
through which the AL has extended its power, including increased politiciza-
tion of local administrative roles, the reduction of independent civil society
space, the reshaping of patron–client relations, and the emergence of new
forms of party-affiliated brokerage. We examine the ways that such strate-
gies have been enacted locally, with efforts to work both through and around
organizations and institutions, as the AL has attempted to strengthen its influ-
ence within community-level processes. In particular, the analysis highlights
the changing interplay between formal and informal political initiatives.
The article draws on two sets of qualitative data from three local com-
munities of Greater Faridpur district in south central Bangladesh, collected
during 2004 and 2016 as part of a study of community-level power and pol-
itics.1 That the two fieldwork periods were just over a decade apart makes
it possible for us to analyse trajectories of change in these communities.
The studies were based on interviews with community leaders, local offi-
cials and civil society activists, and structured focus group discussions with
local people disaggregated by poor and non-poor villagers, and by gender.
Three contrasting fieldwork locations in Greater Faridpur were chosen for
the original study to reflect differences in infrastructure and connectivity,
with one well-connected, one peri-urban, and one remote village community
(Lewis and Hossain, 2008). For the follow-up study we returned to the three
locations, using the same data collection approach. Fieldwork was mainly
carried out during the months prior to the 2016 Union Parishad (UP) elec-
tions.2 This provided an opportunity to examine how the three UP Chairs
in our study sites (local leaders nominally affiliated to the opposition BNP)
were faring in the face of AL efforts to consolidate local power. The earlier
study had reported a form of local politics primarily rooted in competition
between patrons and only weakly linked to the interests of national political
parties. By the time of our return, these local leaders had become increas-
ingly marginalized by the extending power of the ruling party. Each was
now struggling to maintain his authority in the face of efforts by local AL
party activists, in conjunction with the local Member of Parliament (MP), to
establish greater control of local institutions, connect with local constituents,
and ensure that the party would be successful in the local elections.
We analyse these data using a post-structural approach to state formation
(Lund, 2006, 2016). Changing forms of local political practice have enabled
the AL and its supporters to consolidate local power by reshaping interac-
tions between local government and civil society. We find that during the
period under study the AL has gradually concentrated its control over state
1. Both the original study and its follow-up were commissioned by the Embassy of Sweden,
Dhaka.
2. The Union Parishad, or council, is the smallest rural administrative and local government
unit in Bangladesh. A more detailed description is provided below.
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resources in these areas as a result of its growing use of informal connec-
tions between party and state networks. The result is a reduced level of local
political competition and the achievement of electoral dominance by the
AL. The effects of this strategy have not only disempowered the political
opposition, but also strengthened the capacities of local patrons — in both
formal and informal positions of power — to better meet the needs of their
clients and thereby secure political support. In developing our analysis, we
therefore draw upon, and reframe, recent conceptualizations of informality
and patronage. In describing and analysing these trends, the article aims to
make a contribution to the literature on the informal dimensions of politi-
cal processes. A key strength of the approach is that the re-study offers a
rare opportunity to trace how informal political practices have changed over
time.
The argument in the article is developed as follows. First, we discuss
changing local power relations in Bangladesh in the context of local gov-
ernment institutions and ongoing processes of decentralization. Second, we
analyse changing local political practice in terms of the shifting interaction
of formal and informal initiatives, with a selective critical discussion of
literature on informality and patronage. The third section draws on this to
present and analyse our empirical data. We identify four main ways through
which this shift is being enacted locally through strategies of circumvention,
capture, brokerage and the creation of new organizations. Each of these
four dimensions of political consolidation is then briefly illustrated using
empirical vignettes.
LOCAL POWER, INFORMALITY AND PATRONAGE IN BANGLADESH
The formal administration of local government in rural areas is organized
around a system of elected Union Parishads or councils, that form the lower
tier of the country’s administrative system, with each one normally serving
a total of nine villages. These are part of a long history of efforts by central
authorities to establish control in rural areas, going back both to the British
colonial period, and to three military governments that took control of the
country during the 1970s and 1980s. The UP was originally established by
the colonial authorities in 1870 with appointed rather than elected mem-
bership for the purpose of local control, tax collection and improving local
roads. From 1983 onwards, UPs were constituted by an elected chair, nine
ordinary members and three women members. The UPs continued to orga-
nize local economic activities and, while state authority came to be exercised
mainly through them, political parties played little role. An existing informal
power structure based primarily on clan, landholding and patronage became
incorporated into these local administrative bodies through a ‘loose cou-
pling’ arrangement, with the UPs remaining closer to rural administration
than to genuine local government (Jahangir, 1982: 24).
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The UPs serve as distribution points for central development resources
that are allocated by elected, locally accountable members who chair vari-
ous standing committees, convene and facilitate local dispute settlement, and
organize the collection of local revenue from the licensing of marketplaces
and awarding of fishing rights. Project Implementation Committees (PICs)
oversee local development projects, chaired by elected UP members. Al-
though many regimes have attempted to politicize local government, such as
General Ziaur Rahman’s attempt to build gram sarkar (village government)
arrangements during the 1970s, or General H.M. Ershad’s creation of the
new upazila (sub-district unit) in the 1980s, these structures have until re-
cently been only weakly articulated with national political parties, and have
remained more firmly tied to local landowning elites. This pattern continued
into the post-1991 period of parliamentary democracy, where local politics
became the struggle to capture and control the lower part of the pyramid,
where state resources were distributed to community-level clients, and local
political leaders shifted their allegiance between the two political party blocs
on a pragmatic basis.
Local administrative bodies such as the UPs and the upazilas have for
many years also been subject to a range of ‘capacity-building’ initiatives
supported by international donors such as the World Bank, as part of de-
velopmental efforts ostensibly to strengthen local governance and improve
accountability to citizens. The 2009 Local Government (Union Parishad)
Act further widened the role of the UP by introducing new arrangements
at ward (village) level intended to promote ‘social accountability’ through
the introduction of open budget meetings, improved arrangements for peo-
ple to access local information and services, including issuing documents
and certificates, and new formal arrangements for representatives of civil
society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to play roles in
local planning and budgeting (Ahmed et al., 2010). The Act also introduced
a Citizen Charter to provide more transparent information about the UPs’
responsibilities in relation to service provision and rights of citizens, aligned
with a Right to Information Act that was passed in 2009.
When local elections took place in 2016, the AL gained formal control of
most of the country’s UPs. Nationally, a total of 2,661 AL chairpersons were
elected, and only 367 from the BNP. Compared with 2011, the BNP’s share
of seats fell from 38 per cent to only 9 per cent, while the AL’s increased
from 49 per cent to 70 per cent. In our study area two of the previously
BNP-affiliated UP chairs were replaced with AL candidates. In the third site
there was no UP election since, following the encroachment of the town, it
had decided to apply to become a municipality.
Our data show how the AL has used informal connections to develop
tighter control over state resources and has successfully translated this into
electoral advantage. This has been achieved through extending the broker-
age roles and activities of local party workers, capturing local bodies (or
bypassing them in cases where AL does not have political control) and, in
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a few cases, through the creation of entirely new local organizations. We
do not suggest that local political consolidation should only be understood
with reference to local factors. Rather, it has been substantially underpinned
by a much wider set of national-level strategies such as: (1) extending the
role and influence of MPs who determine the distribution of key central
government resources that flow into local areas; (2) maintaining the contin-
uing economic dynamism that extends household livelihood options through
small enterprise and migration opportunities; and (3) increased control of
civil society space so that conditions for service provision and economic sup-
port by civil society organizations are prioritized over rights-based work and
critical advocacy. The AL’s electoral success around the country has also
been facilitated by a combination of straightforward electoral popularity,
vote rigging and the use of organized violence.3
THE SHIFTING INTERACTION OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL
INITIATIVES
In order to understand further how this consolidation has taken place, it
is necessary to focus first on the changing interaction between formal and
informal politics, and second on the patronage relations that inform the dy-
namics of local politics. Bangladesh’s political settlement (the balance of
power between social classes) has enabled a relatively high level of eco-
nomic growth and secured positive changes in relation to social indicators,
particularly in health and education. However, this has not generally been
understood as producing the conditions that can support either a stable or
an inclusive democracy. For example, to meet the criteria of North et al.’s
(2007) concept of an ‘open access’ political system would require the exis-
tence of formal property rights, enforceable contracts, and an efficient and
impersonal bureaucracy, none of which are sufficiently present. The dom-
inant form of political organization is one of competitive clientelism that
requires that most forms of organized political action (and economic activ-
ity) will normally involve the purchase of support on a personalized basis
(Khan, 2013). Without a state that can enforce the rule of law in a system-
atic way, forms of rent seeking are commonplace. In North et al.’s terms,
Bangladesh can therefore be regarded as a ‘limited access order’ that meets
few of the conditions for a functioning democracy.
Yet state and public authority, as Lund (2016: 1200) has argued, needs to
be understood not just in terms of how it matches or falls short of an idealized
template, but also in terms of how it actually works, and how in this sense it is
always ‘in the making’. A post-structuralist approach emphasizes the ruling
party’s efforts to inhabit the state in ways that redefine the conditions and
3. While there were media reports of violence and vote rigging in many areas, we did not hear
of this in our three study locations.
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organizing logics through which people encounter and experience it. This
requires an analysis of how the ruling party attempts to manage local-level
political competition, rights and resources in ways that ensure the conditions
not only for exercising governance, but also for consolidating its political
power in local areas. This is achieved not only through the use of formal
channels, such as by changing administrative rules or laws, but also through
the deployment of a set of interlinked informal initiatives and activities.
The analysis of informality enables insight into the workings of power
structures beyond the surface level and makes visible ‘interactions and ne-
gotiations far away from the transparent and accountable systems of modern
government’ (Mitlin, 2014: 3). Yet as a mode of organizing, informality
operates within and not just outside formal institutions. Formal and informal
activities and relationships cannot easily be disentangled (Meagher, 1995;
Wood, 2000), and each help mediate relationships between state and society.
The informal dimensions of public authority are central to the working of
local power structures. People’s daily experience is one of interacting not
only with the formal rules associated with governance, but also with an array
of informal arrangements. Focusing on the extent and type of informality
offers insights into how power is being exercised, by whom, and for whose
benefit. Resisting a conceptualization of a fixed boundary between formal
state institutions and informal relations, we favour a post-structural view
in which the state can be seen to promote informality as part of efforts to
secure its authority. As Blundo (2006: 799) shows, this approach can help
reveal changes in the ‘operational logics’ of local government and the ways
in which the informal may become institutionalized as part of the state’s
everyday mode of operation. Also useful here is Roy’s (2009: 82) concept
of ‘calculated informality’. Roy characterizes informality as a ‘mode of
practice’, and India’s planning regime as ‘an informalized entity, one that
is a state of deregulation, ambiguity, and exception’ (ibid.: 76). As a result,
informality needs to be understood politically as integral to how the state
operates rather than simply as a casual or spontaneous aspect of individual
relationships.
Bangladesh’s society is strongly hierarchical, and widely structured by
patronage relations. Breman (1974: 18) defined patronage as ‘a pattern of
relationships in which members of hierarchically arranged groups possess
mutually recognized, not explicitly stipulated rights and obligations involv-
ing mutual aid and preferential treatment’. Vertical social arrangements of
mutual obligation and loyalty are constructed between unequal individuals
through which negotiations around access to resources, protection, social
mobility and political support take place. For Jahangir (1982), patronage
is a personal transaction between two interested individuals as opposed to
one directed at addressing the collective good, and he distinguishes both
economic and political forms. This personalized quality is a key reason as to
why it remains difficult for poorer people in Bangladesh to build ‘horizontal’
relationships of solidarity among equals, such as through joining coopera-
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tives or the community groups that both government and NGOs have tried
to form at various times (Lewis, 2017). From the point of view of clients,
such vertical relationships are not only asymmetrical and personal but also
uncertain, since they remain discretionary rather than formalized or rights-
based. Patronage is central to the organization of informality within political
practice.
Patron–client relations are rarely straightforward or fixed, but are complex,
multi-stranded and always evolving. As Leonard et al. (2010: 482) point out,
‘patronage is not disappearing so much as changing its shape’. In Indonesia,
for example, Simandjuntak (2013: 96) describes the changing patterns of
elite competition that allowed ordinary people to increase their capacity to
choose ‘which patrons were suitable for them’. For Piliavsky (2014) emerg-
ing forms of democratic statehood in South Asia have not dampened the
practice of patronage which instead thrives ‘alongside and often through it’,
persisting not as ‘a feudal residue, but a current political form in its own
right’ (ibid.: 4). It should not only be seen in functional economic or politi-
cal terms but also as a ‘living moral idiom’ that helps to structure people’s
political aspirations, engagements, practices and relationships (ibid.). Pa-
tronage should not be seen merely as a mode of exploitation, as a barrier to
democracy, or a vestige of tradition, but also as a productive relationship. It
can be understood productively as a linking mechanism between urban and
rural spheres, or between bureaucracies and local traditional institutions. Pa-
tronage relationships can also be viewed as the means through which those
who are poor or excluded undertake their civic engagement, seek to improve
their security and practice politics.
Those who emphasize the importance of a vibrant civil society as a nec-
essary condition for democratic consolidation tend not to view patronage
favourably. It is usually regarded as antithetical to the working of civil soci-
ety since it is enacted through unequal vertical relationships rather than ones
based on horizontal forms of solidarity.4 Such a distinction is challenged, but
in another sense also supported, by Chatterjee’s (2004: 4) conceptualization
of governance and democracy in India. He has suggested that civil society,
with its formal rules and laws, may serve powerful interests so that it is
merely a ‘closed association of elite groups’, set aside from the broader pop-
ulation of ordinary poor people. The poor are instead forced to negotiate and
contest their claims in relation to government within the wider and messier
uncivil space of ‘political society’ where there are fewer formal rules and
norms. Patronage here has a positive character, since it provides a means
through which poor people can advance their interests in ways that challenge
lawful but exclusionary ‘formal’ civil society frameworks.
4. See for example Robert Putnam’s (1993) contrasting of the idea of ‘social capital’ with
Edward Banfield’s (1958) concept of ‘amoral familism’ in his analysis of the unevenness
of democracy in Italy.
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Martin’s (2014) analysis of patronage from Pakistan questions the opti-
mism of Chatterjee’s perspective. He finds that patronage arrangements tend
to benefit elites more than they do ordinary people, by actively undermining
the possibility of universal service provision, limiting poor people’s rights,
contributing to the de facto privatization of public services, and reducing the
potential for impartiality in dispute settlement. The assertion that ordinary
people benefit from ‘political society’ as a sphere of patronage that by-
passes ‘bourgeois law’ and bureaucratic procedure (because it allows them
to extend their freedoms using means other than the legal rights supposedly
available to them within ‘civil society’) ignores what Martin terms the ‘dark
side’ of patronage. Our analysis also suggests an oversimplification implicit
in Chatterjee’s dualism, since there are intertwined elements of both civil
and political societies apparent in local forms of organizing and action in
Faridpur. But at the same time, Chatterjee’s description of politicians who
operate in political society by ‘circumventing and breaking the law to ap-
pease their constituents’ (Martin, 2014: 327) is consistent with an emphasis
on the interaction of formal and informal initiatives. For example, while this
produces arrangements that are — from the perspective of many ordinary
poor people — both insecure and non-permanent, it may bring other benefits.
A recent shrinking of civil society space observed in 2016 in Faridpur can
also be set against the positive economic climate and the expansion of public
services and social safety nets.5
UNDERSTANDING LOCAL POLITICAL PRACTICE
The re-study provided an opportunity to analyse how informality and patron-
age have changed in rural areas. Influential studies such as ‘The Net: Power
Structure in Ten Villages’ (BRAC, 1982) have tended to represent village-
level power structures as closed, predatory and dominated by traditional
elites. By the turn of the millennium, researchers from rural Bangladesh
were reporting that the power structure was becoming less rigid, with a
wider range of patrons with which poorer people could negotiate alongside
traditional landowners, including non-landholding elites and civil society ac-
tors. Our 2004 data confirmed this picture, with forms of political negotiation
and local problem solving that were consistent with what we (and others)
had seen as an ‘opening up’ of local village-based rural power structures
(Lewis and Hossain, 2008). This wider selection of potential patrons from
which people could choose — including local elected officials, party politi-
5. Since the 2004 study, provision of social protection has expanded. A total of 145 ‘social
safety net’ schemes — including Test Relief, Food For Work, Vulnerable Group Develop-
ment, and other welfare payments — are now provided through 23 different government
ministries, although it is reported that 25–50 per cent do not reach the intended recipients
due to poor targeting and corruption (The Daily Star, 2016).
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cians, NGOs and local business leaders — could also be accessed through a
growing range of brokers.6
This trend is consistent with Leonard et al.’s (2010) observation that
there has been a general shift in the character of patronage relationships in
many societies away from local land-based monopolies of power towards
a situation where clients can benefit from growing competition between
different potential patrons seeking influence, since it becomes possible for
clients to exert more leverage within patronage relationships. The result
has been that a more diverse and less unitary ‘multifocal power structure’
has taken shape in rural Bangladesh, bringing greater room for manoeuvre
for people as they go about negotiating with local elites (Mannan, 2015).
The earlier metaphor of the ‘net’ had been appropriate because it implied
relationships that had mainly constrained, but now there was increased scope
for poorer people to build more connections potentially linking them with
productive resources and opportunities (see Gardner, 2012).
In Faridpur, our first set of data had suggested that these changing con-
ditions were creating new opportunities to participate in, challenge and
sometimes transform local institutions in more democratic ways (Lewis and
Hossain, 2008). For example, there were signs of emerging pro-poor syner-
gies between local government officials and civil society actors. Despite a
national and local political system that had become highly adversarial and
polarized between two confrontational political party blocs, we found some
cases of positive, negotiated change taking place locally. In some cases,
these were enabling ordinary people to have more participation in local
decision making (such as in the choice of local infrastructure projects), or
were strengthening the rights of the landless. For example, one elected UP
leader was found to be cooperating with NGO-formed landless groups to
strengthen land rights and increase his local popularity. Another social mo-
bilization NGO working in the area had built a productive relationship with
a UP Chair that enabled a group of landless to enforce stronger claims and
establish rights in relation to an area of khas land7 that was being encroached
upon by local elites.
Local informal institutions were also changing. We found more inclusive
shalish arrangements (village-level dispute settlement bodies convened by
elders and local officials), supported by government and NGO projects, with
outcomes that improved access to justice at least for some local women.
Village elites seemed to be more ready to accept more gender-inclusive
6. Brokers are intermediaries who use their knowledge and networks to connect people to
opportunities and resources. The concept of brokerage is useful because it captures a key
aspect of agency which, in keeping with the idea of informality, is that local political
practice may not follow orderly or predictable scripts but instead may take improvised or
even disorderly forms (Mosse and Lewis, 2006).
7. Khas land is newly available unowned land that emerges from rivers when they shift course.
It is earmarked by law for redistribution to low-income households under land reform
legislation, but is frequently illegally occupied by local landowners.
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shalish arrangements, particularly if this increased the reputation of local
leaders, and helped to attract outside resources. At this time there was a
fashion for donors and NGOs to support this type of modernization of the
shalish. The findings from the earlier study also indicated a high degree of
local diversity: these issues were playing out differently across the three
settings that were studied, suggesting that context and locality — such as
the state of the economy, the types and extent of civil society organizations
that were operating, and the individual strategies of local political leaders
— mattered considerably.
Returning to the same communities for the follow-up study, we encoun-
tered significant changes. A more dynamic economy meant that most people
were now significantly better off than they had been in the mid-2000s, and
in two of the three locations there had been major improvements in both the
extent and quality of local infrastructure. At the same time, we found fewer
NGOs or other civil society organizations doing rights-based work than we
had observed before. With the local elections about to take place in UPs
that were controlled by opposition BNP-affiliated popular local leaders, the
ruling AL was now working hard to strengthen its influence and control of
local government institutions. Where there was an elected official in place
who was inconveniently from the opposition party, we observed various
efforts to try to work around the problem.
A distinctive set of local informal political practices is occurring that takes
four interrelated forms: (1) circumvention, where for example the bypassing
of the UP provided a mechanism for the AL to distribute resources directly
to its support base; (2) capture, such as the increased ability of AL activists
to determine shalish outcomes, or to influence local School Committees; (3)
brokerage, carried out by informal party ‘helpers’, that extends the AL’s
reach into local communities, such as a minority community lawyer who
helped broker stronger ties with outside AL activists to ensure safeguard-
ing of the rights and vulnerabilities of local community members; and (4)
creation of new organizations, such as a newly-established auto-rickshaw
driver association that was a work-around to avoid problems over rickshaw
licensing.
While these are not new phenomena in rural Bangladesh, they contain new
dimensions. Such practices extend and adapt existing types of informality
and indicate important changes taking place in the conduct of local gover-
nance and politics. The need to analyse these changes is further supported
by data from other studies, although to date work on this has been mainly
drawn from urban contexts. For example, in a study of space and ‘encroach-
ment’ in a Dhaka slum, Hackenbroch and Hossain (2012) draw attention to
the transformations taking place in urban space through types of ‘informal
formalization’. They find that poorer residents’ access to water and other
services takes the form of protected business opportunities that may provide
short-term benefits but ultimately restrict people’s rights and choices. More
recently, Jackman (2017) has analysed key aspects of the micro-politics of
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AL consolidation efforts through the changing use of different forms of in-
termediation. Jackman’s data suggest that the previously well-documented
significance of the mastaan (hoodlum or ‘strong man’ figure) was fading in
the Dhaka slum areas where he conducted his ethnographic research, being
replaced instead by a set of informal arrangements that were being more
directly enforced through the AL party and its associates.
In our earlier study we had found that local political leaders, while nom-
inally affiliated to national political parties, drew most of their legitimacy
from their local reputations as elite patrons and from clan affiliation (Lewis
and Hossain, 2008). Our 2016 data indicated growing political control from
the centre, with a larger proportion of resources flowing into local communi-
ties (including those for development projects, an increased range of social
welfare payments and the greater use of discretionary MP funds). There is
a tighter grip on the institutions that are supposed to make local decentral-
ized decisions about how these resources are to be used, and in the case of
welfare benefits, decisions about who should get what. Local administrative
arrangements have therefore been more strongly politicized in political party
terms. Overall, the two main trends we observe in the contemporary picture
drawn from our recent fieldwork are that while politics has always been
partisan, it has become more so; and that the AL has become more adept at
consolidating its power at the local level.
In this way, the informal political practices we have described are under-
pinned by, and intermingled with, changes made to formal arrangements.
As Wood (2000) reminds us, there is permeability between formal and in-
formal institutions. For example, in a formal change to regulations made
since our earlier study, the government no longer requires that the UP
PICs must be chaired by an elected UP member. This makes it possible
for local political activists to achieve more influence in the allocation of
resources in UPs even where the opposition party is formally in control.
At the sub-district level, the Upazila Development Coordination Commit-
tees (UDCCs) that we had previously observed playing significant roles
in the oversight of local development processes, have also now become
sidelined.
Another example of a formal change that underpins these informal prac-
tices is the recent party politicization of the UP election process. In 2015, the
government decided that, for the first time, voting in the elections was to be
organized along strict political party lines. This was a significant difference
compared with the previous election in 2011, since all candidates were now
to be nominated by political parties, and would use party symbols on their
campaigning materials and ballot papers to contest the election. Previously,
political parties had given only informal backing to their candidates, and
aspiring candidates could therefore file their nominations without requiring
party approval. This is a formal change that reflects the AL’s intention to
create a greater level of centrally controlled party politicization of local
processes.
Local Political Consolidation in Bangladesh 13
In the following sub-sections, we move on to illustrate each of the four
interrelated dimensions of informal political practice in more detail, using
brief vignettes drawn from the data.
Circumvention
The bypassing of local institutions is a key element of political practice.
For example, in the well-connected village, when it comes to local public
services, ordinary people’s access is not only heavily personalized (as it
was before) but is now also increasingly party-linked. The elected members
of the UP draw up lists of eligible people, as before, but the UP Chair
— under pressure from the AL-affiliated Upazila Chairman — now also
puts aside a proportion (believed to be around 50 per cent) for specific
distribution to local party leaders, activists and supporters. This was also
the case with the allocation and management of road repair and renovation
projects, many of which are now under the control of party leaders and
activists, allowing them to provide resources to clients, reward existing
supporters and enlist new ones. In the new scenario, the UP Chairman and
members are able to implement a smaller proportion of projects through the
formal UP channels than we had observed during the earlier study. The UP’s
standing committees, which are supposed to widen local decision making
and provide oversight of local development activities, were therefore less
active (and in some cases totally inactive).
The UP is also engaged in local resource mobilization. However, when
it comes to the leasing of local water bodies and allocation of marketplace
trading licences, we found that people affiliated to the political opposition
now considered it futile to participate in the tendering process, since it was
fully controlled by the ruling party and not open. In the peri-urban village the
local AL president, and not the BNP-affiliated UP Chair, was now the most
powerful source of authority, securing a high degree of influence over the UP.
For example, he was found to conduct the most important shalishes, such as
those concerned with local land disputes, rather than the UP Chairman who
has formal responsibility for this. We also heard some reports of shalishes
that were now being convened by leaders of the local Chhatra League, the
AL’s student wing.
In both cases, the relationship between the MP and the Upazila Chairman
is crucial in helping to cement these forms of bypass arrangement. As a
result, decisions about who is entitled to social welfare benefits are no
longer the sole preserve of the elected UP authority but are now shared with
the local party. In the remote area, around 70 per cent of the vulnerable
group development programme (VGD) cards are still distributed as normal
through the UP, but the remaining 30 per cent are allocated by local AL
leaders and activists. The Upazila Chair simply informs the UP staff of
the MP’s instructions. This is also the case with Test Relief and Food
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for Work (FFW) programme entitlements. Local AL leaders draw up lists
of recipients and submit them to the MP, who then sends his approved
instructions down to the UP officials. In the case of the FFW programmes,
which require decisions about local infrastructure building and repairs, the
Upazila Project Implementation Officer makes an assessment and issues
instructions according to the MP’s recommendations, thereby circumventing
UP-level PICs.
Capture
Our earlier data made it clear that many of the local institutions that are
regarded as forming part of local civil society, such as School Commit-
tees, Business Associations, Bazaar Committees and transport organiza-
tions, were sites of contestation between political parties. From our 2016
data, it was striking how comprehensively the AL had now secured effective
control of civil society groups such as School Committees and Business
Associations, as well as local administrative committees such as those re-
sponsible for leasing markets and water bodies. This finding is reminiscent
of Lund’s (2006) concept of ‘twilight institutions’ in which he suggests that
alongside the more familiar arenas of politics, political authority can be
wielded and negotiated within organizations that do not at first sight seem
political.
For example, an important water body in one Union is controlled by the
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) and leased out each year for
valuable fishing rights. It used to be the case that the UP would arrange for an
annual advertisement for leasing to be distributed, and any interested fishing
group could bid for rights to fish, with the highest bidder granted access
for the season. However, the ruling party, through the local leadership of
the Jubo League (the youth wing of the AL), has in recent years ignored
these rules, and explicitly forbidden other groups from participating in the
bidding process. With the support of the local MP, who is also a minister,
they suspended normal arrangements and effectively captured the tender
process. As a result, political pressure was successfully exerted to ensure
that the BWDB ignores all other applications in favour of this particular one,
such that the rules that were previously adhered to no longer apply.
In the case of local religious associations such as Mosque or Temple Com-
mittees, we found that rather than being explicitly politicized, compared to
the first study, they had mostly withdrawn into a narrower religious function.
The wider community roles that we had observed in the earlier study — such
as becoming more involved in shalish and in some cases making such bodies
more diverse and inclusive — had diminished. An exception was when the
Mosque Committee agreed to cooperate with a community group that was
briefly formed to prevent a local gang from extorting money from people at
an embankment crossing point, by broadcasting a warning message.
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Some attempts at capture were nevertheless resisted. In the peri-urban
village we encountered a case in which the main local AL leader had become
chair of the High School Committee, but had failed to secure re-election. This
was because a controversy had emerged after he had refused some students
the chance to re-sit exams. This decision had been perceived as illegitimate
and made only for political reasons, and was resisted as an abuse of power.
In the well-connected village, the MP and his associates (with the support
of the AL chair of the local Bazaar Committee) attempted to profit from
extending local shops onto public land that had long been used as a football
field. The encroachment was protested by local people and their claims
taken up by the UP Chairman. He successfully resisted the illegal activity by
enlisting support from a group of journalists from the local Press Club, who
campaigned against it using the media and attracting help from a national-
level advocacy NGO. A human chain was organized during a visit to the
area by the Prime Minister, and the unauthorized shops were demolished
shortly afterwards. Such cases of resistance also illustrate the fragile nature
of such state making highlighted within the post-structural approach.
Brokerage
Brokers actively constitute their social and political roles in ways that reflect
local conditions, opportunities and constraints. The character of brokerage
activities has changed from the earlier fieldwork so that today in Faridpur we
find increasing numbers and an enhanced significance of what Berenschot
(2019) calls ‘party-affiliated brokers’. Two examples can be used to illustrate
this.
In the remote village, a former leftist activist, who had gained the respect
of villagers for his principled stands on various issues in the past, was elected
in 2011 as an AL UP member, despite the UP’s overall control by the BNP.
He had built a good relationship with the local MP and assisted the AL
extend its power further into the village, enabling the MP to bypass the UP
Chair. His election as a local council member for the AL came at a time
when he had been charged along with several other activists for a violent
robbery and he was elected while in custody. When he and his colleagues
were later released, the others were killed by military police in a so-called
‘cross fire’ incident (often a pretext for extrajudicial killings) but he had been
saved through his relationship with the MP. This strategy has smoothed a
path for the AL to incorporate the village more fully into its patronage
network, despite the strength of local support for the BNP-affiliated UP
Chair. By making a popular local political leader into a client of the AL he
has become a valuable resource, offering a better way for the party to secure
influence than simply trying to impose power from outside. The ruling party
has been successful in this area in constructing alliances with locally rooted
and trusted leftist activists.
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In the peri-urban village, we found another intermediary from the local
bedia (‘river gypsy’) minority community, many of whom have lived for
many years as squatters in an informal settlement on railway embankment
land. A community lawyer and AL activist since his student days, he has
through his contacts so far been able to prevent their eviction. Members of
this community have been joined in recent years by other locals seeking to
escape the effects of nearby river erosion, and this influx has exacerbated
pressures. The result has been periodic attempts by the police and other local
authorities to remove bedia from illegally occupied land. The lawyer had
recently used his contacts to bring the local MP to a community meeting
and had managed to secure an agreement to protect bedia rights. With the
support of the AL Upazila Chair he has also come to serve as an informal
‘coordinator’ for his UP, where he also oversees many local development
projects. He explained to us that he has been able to access both MP and UP
funds and these have enabled him to undertake madrasa, temple, mosque
and school projects along with local road maintenance work. During the
BNP regime, he told us, there had been fewer local roads and less reg-
ular repairs. He has also lobbied for and secured construction of a new
bridge over the river nearby and is involved in plans to build a new local
college.
Creation of New Organizations
The capacity both to break rules and to ‘get around’ them by creating new
structures is another important dimension of informal political action. For
example, we noticed on returning to Greater Faridpur that there was a new
type of electric auto-rickshaw that had become available locally since our
earlier study. This improved vehicle had quickly become popular with lo-
cal drivers, since it saved labour and improved journey times, and it was
affordable with the help of business loans that are easily obtained by NGOs
operating in the local area. However, the new rickshaw was technically ille-
gal because it had not yet been officially licensed for use by the government.
In response to unhappy rickshaw operators, this bottleneck had recently
been overcome by local activists from the ruling party who had managed to
use their contacts to establish a new local rickshaw driver association that
provided drivers with protection against prosecution. This made it possible
to circumvent the rules and ensure that drivers could pursue their business
without interference from the police.
CONCLUSION
There has been a shift during the past decade towards a more partisan form
of local politics in rural Bangladesh, where most local organizations are
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now firmly controlled by the ruling political party. This is in contrast to
the picture encountered earlier, when local leaders and office holders were
only loosely associated with the national political parties. Local political
consolidation by the AL has been achieved through the activities of party-
affiliated power holders playing both formal and informal political roles, in
some cases gaining control of local decision-making bodies, and in others
working around them using informal strategies. Formal changes to the rules,
such as bringing party symbols into local elections, removing the need for
PICs to be chaired by an elected UP member, and increasing the discretionary
funds available to MPs for local distribution, have also helped underpin this
consolidation of local power.
The cases discussed in this article add to our understanding of how post-
colonial states take their shape through everyday micro-politics. As the ruling
party attempts to re-engineer the country’s political and administrative sys-
tems towards a one-party democracy, we see how in the post-structural sense
Bangladesh’s state continues to be remade (Lund, 2016). Here informality
is not only something that occurs around the edges of ‘formal’ institutions,
but forms an intrinsic part of the way the ruling party plans and governs.
What Sen, in his discussion of hybrid political settlements, describes as the
‘interplay of both formal and informal institutions in the growth maintenance
process’ (Sen, 2015: 51) has played an important role in the AL’s prepa-
rations for and subsequent successes in the 2016 UP elections and more
recently in the 2018 national elections that returned the party to power for
an unprecedented third term.
These processes cannot be understood without paying close attention to
how the benefits and gains are distributed among those not only with power,
but also those without. While models of ‘encroachment’ by the powerful on
the powerless (such as Hackenbroch and Hossain, 2012) are instructive, they
do not fully explain the trajectories of local political consolidation observed
in Faridpur, where outcomes are more locally varied and sometimes more
positive for ordinary citizens than the macro-level templates of political
economists might suggest. This mix of formal and informal practices implies
neither a purely instrumental relationship that narrows people’s political
options to impose the AL’s agenda, nor a simple opening up of patronage
choices that necessarily benefits poor clients as they seek to advance their
livelihoods.
Understanding this unfolding micro-politics on its own terms requires
us to pay attention to the moral as well as to the instrumental dimensions
of political patronage, as Piliavsky (2014) has argued. The ruling party
deploys a moral component within patronage relationships when it projects
its commitment to solving key local problems of inadequate services, weak
infrastructure and poor law and order, and allocates resources for these
purposes. It also does so by attempting to reframe the past with promises of a
better future. Earlier periods of instability and disorder are today represented
by the AL as now having been superseded by an improved governance regime
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that listens more closely to people and gets things done. For example, many
local residents in our re-study perceived that law and order in Faridpur had
improved compared with the earlier era of competitive clientelism, which
was associated with ineffective policing and widespread mastaan activity.
This picture fits within a powerful national narrative in which the AL is
recovering its role as the ‘natural’ party of government that helped create
the nation in 1971.
Within an overall context of export-led economic growth, the AL has
delivered increased prosperity and relative stability, reshaping patronage
arrangements alongside new forms of party-affiliated brokerage in ways that
respond to local needs. In recognizing and consolidating informal and formal
power at the local level, the party has become more adept at dominating the
local power structure. The longer-term implications of this combination of
consolidated AL power, a strong economy, weakened political opposition,
and reduction of civil society diversity are not easy to predict. While the new
and changing forms of patronage arrangements that are currently in place are
based on long-standing social institutions, the effects of the ruling party’s
increasing dominance within the social networks that connect people, power
and resources may damage the future stability and inclusivity of the political
system.
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